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The Supreme Court's reversal of the Fifth Circuit's refusal to grant federal
habeas relief to Texas death row inmate Scott PanettiI was an odd finale to a Term
widely viewed as reflecting a sharp turn to the right under the stewardship of the
new Chief Justice, John Roberts. Indeed, the same day Panetti was decided, the
Court handed down its invalidation of two voluntary school desegregation plans,2
leading Justice Breyer to offer a lengthy and stinging dissent from the bench,
which included the dire lament: "It is not often in the law that so few have so
quickly changed so much."3  A month later, Senator Charles Schumer gave a
rousing speech decrying the way the Senate had been hoodwinked during
Roberts's confirmation hearings, recalling with derision Roberts's pledge of
judicial modesty in which the then-nominee described the role a of judge as mere
"umpire" rather than player in legal disputes. Quipped Schumer, "If the past
Supreme Court Term were a movie, it might be called 'The Umpire Strikes
Back.' 4 While the Term was undoubtedly a disappointment overall to liberals, it
was not nearly so bleak in the arena of capital punishment. A victory for a death
row inmate is a rare event in any Term, and Panetti was one of four capital
reversals from Texas alone in the 2006 Term. To carry on Schumer's parody,
while the "Umpire" may have been striking back, the "Death Star" (Lone Star?)
was under serious attack.
Panetti thus has clear political import: in a Court trending toward the right, it
reflects a solid coalition of five justices who are willing to put the brakes on the
use of capital punishment--at least in the nation's death penalty powerhouse, a
state responsible for the lion's share of executions since 1976. 5 The Court's
° Howard J. and Katherine W. Aibel Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. Thanks go to
Jordan Steiker for helpful discussions and comments.
I The Supreme Court's decision in the case is Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842 (2007).
2 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
3 Linda Greenhouse, Justices, Voting 5-4, Limit the Use of Race in Integration Plans, N.Y.
TIMES, June 29, 2007, at Al.
4 Schumer Declares Democrats Hoodwinked into Confirming Chief Justice Roberts, Urges
Higher Burden of Proof for Any Future Bush Nominees, July, 27, 2007,
http://www.senate.gov/-schumer/SchumerWebsite/pressroom/record.cfm?id=280107&.
5 Texas is responsible for 405 of the 1,099 executions since 1976, and more than half (26 out
of 41) of the executions performed thus far in 2007. See Death Penalty Info. Center, Number of
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decision in Panetti managed to discredit the Eighth Amendment holdings of both
the Texas state courts and the Fifth Circuit, reflecting the same exasperation with
these courts' parsimonious (at best) or mutinous (at worst) readings of Supreme
Court precedent that was evident in the Court's other capital reversals earlier in the
Term.6 Just a few weeks before announcing its decision in Panetti, the Court also
rejected the state of Texas's plea to review a decision of the very closely divided
en banc Fifth Circuit, which (finally) offered capital defendants a generous
interpretation of Supreme Court precedent.7
At the same time, however, a different coalition on the Court has been reining
in the other outlier in the administration of capital punishment--the Ninth Circuit,
which has regularly pushed the envelope of the Court's Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence to protect capital defendants, usually from the state of California,
which has the largest death row in the country.8 Justice Kennedy, the key swing
vote here as elsewhere, abandoned the liberal wing of the Court to reverse all three
Ninth Circuit grants of habeas relief in capital cases this past Term.9 This
Kennedy-led crusade to temper both the Fifth Circuit's enthusiasm and the Ninth
Circuit's reluctance to allow executions to go forward is reminiscent of the middle
ground forged in an earlier era of death penalty regulation. In the 1970s and
1980s, a centrist coalition (of which Justice Stevens is the only member still sitting
on the Court) forged a middle path between death penalty abolitionists (Brennan
and Marshall) and death penalty de-regulators (Burger, Rehnquist, and Scalia).
This "mend it, don't end it" approach led to the creation of the complex body of
law that the Court now oversees in the Fifth, Ninth, and other federal circuits, as
well as in state supreme courts. Kennedy seems determined to keep the Court on
the same middle path in its role as overseer of the centrist legacy, and he has used
his swing vote to maintain this course throughout this past Term.
What Panetti means in terms of mapping the overarching politics of the Court
is much clearer, however, than what it means in its particulars for the complex
Executions by State and Region Since 1976,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=8&did= 186 (last visited Oct. 10, 2007).
6 See Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 1654 (2007); Brewer v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct.
1706 (2007); Smith v. Texas, 127 S. Ct. 1686 (2007).
7 See Quarterman v. Nelson, 127 S. Ct. 2974 (2007) (denying certiorari); Nelson v.
Quarterman, 472 F.3d 287 (2006) (en banc) (granting federal habeas relief on the ground that Texas's
capital sentencing procedure failed to give constitutionally sufficient effect to petitioner's mitigating
evidence in violation of Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), and Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S.
274 (2004)).
8 California has 660 inmates on its death row, as compared to 393 in Texas. See Death
Penalty Info. Center, Death Row Inmates by State and Size of Death Row by Year,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=9&did=188#state (last visited Oct. 10, 2007). But
in executions, Texas by far outstrips California, with 405 compared to 13 since 1976. See Death
Penalty Info. Center, Number of Executions by State and Region Since 1976,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=8&did=186 (last visited Oct. 10, 2007).
9 See Ayers v. Belmontes, 127 S. Ct. 469 (2006); Schriro v. Landrigan, 127 S. Ct. 1933
(2007); Uttecht v. Brown, 127 S. Ct. 2218 (2007).
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body of capital punishment law of which it is now a part. While the case garnered
by far the most media attention among the four capital cases from Texas that were
reviewed by the Supreme Court this past Term, little of that attention focused on
the particular legal issues presented by the case. Rather, much ink was spilled
documenting the gruesomeness of the crime and the oddities of the defendant. The
facts of the case were indeed horrifying: Panetti broke into the home of his
estranged wife's parents and gunned down his in-laws in front of his wife and
daughter; he then held hostage his wife and daughter until eventually surrendering
to police. And the defendant's odd behavior ensured that the capital trial that
ensued was a circus: Panetti, who had long suffered from severe mental illness,
stopped taking his anti-psychotic medication and insisted on representing himself
During his trial, he engaged in behavior that his appointed standby counsel later
described as "bizarre," "scary," and "trance-like." 1° Dressed in a cowboy suit,
Panetti rambled incoherently and badgered the judge, the prosecuting attorney, and
witnesses. He attempted to subpoena over 200 witnesses, including John F.
Kennedy, the Pope, and Jesus. When he testified about the crime, he assumed the
personality of "Sarge" and spoke in odd, fragmented sentences, such as: "Sarge,
boom, boom. Sarge, boom, boom, boom, boom."
1
'
The most obvious legal issues raised by Panetti's trial were not the ones that
the Supreme Court agreed to review. Amazingly, Panetti was found competent to
stand trial for his life and to represent himself, and these findings were affirmed
every step of the way in appellate and post-conviction proceedings. So was the
jury's rejection of his insanity defense. The issues before the Court involved only
Panetti's much more recent mental competence-his competence to be executed--
and thus called upon the Court to interpret its cryptic precedent in Ford v.
Wainwright,'2 which established that "the Eighth Amendment prohibits a State
from carrying out a sentence of death upon a prisoner who is insane."' 3 As Justice
Powell, who cast the crucial fifth vote in Ford, recognized in his concurring
opinion: "[t]hat conclusion leaves two issues for our determination: (i) the meaning
of insanity in this context, and (ii) the procedures States must follow in order to
avoid the necessity of de novo review in federal [habeas] courts. ,,14 According
to Powell, the standard for competence to be executed requires that those who are
executed know the fact of their impending execution and the reason for it,15 and the
"basic requirements" of due process for determining whether a prisoner is
competent to be executed are that "[t]he State should provide an impartial officer
or board that can receive evidence and argument from the prisoner's counsel,
10 Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842, 2849 (2007).
11 These facts are from the Brief for Petitioner at 11-14, Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct.
2842 (2007) (No. 06-6407).
12 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
13 Id. at 409-10.
14 Id. at 418 (Powell, J., concurring).
"5 Id. at 422.
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including expert psychiatric evidence that may differ from the State's own
psychiatric evidence."'
' 6
Scott Panetti's case raised questions about both of these holdings, but the
Court's opinion is notable for how little it manages to say in answering them. As
for the first holding regarding the substantive standard for competence, Panetti
"knew" in some minimal sense the fact of his impending execution and the reason
for it: he knew that he had been convicted of killing his in-laws and that the state
of Texas claimed that this was the reason that it was seeking to execute him. But
according to expert testimony offered by Panetti's lawyers, Panetti was convinced
that this stated reason was a "sham" and that the real reason Texas sought to
execute him was "to stop him from preaching."' 7 The defense experts testified that
Panetti's longstanding "schizo-affective disorder" was responsible for this
"genuine" and "fixed" delusion.' 8 The Supreme Court held that the Fifth Circuit's
narrow and formalistic test for competence to be executed, which foreclosed any
consideration at all of the rationality of a prisoner's awareness of his pending
execution, was "too restrictive," 19 but the Court also acknowledged that "a concept
like rational understanding is difficult to define"2 and it declined "to set down a
rule governing all competency determinations.' Instead, the Court remanded for
further development of the record and factual findings, and it invited the district
court to try to formulate and apply a more precise standard in the first instance.
The Court was similarly non-committal about the second holding regarding
the necessary procedures for considering a claim of incompetence to be executed.
Accepting that Panetti had made a substantial showing of incompetence in his
initial submissions to the state court, the Court concluded that Panetti was denied
"an adequate opportunity to submit expert evidence in response to the report filed
by the court-appointed experts. 22 It is not clear whether the Court means that
Panetti should have been afforded the evidentiary hearing that he repeatedly
requested, or simply that he should have been permitted to file further affidavits
from defense experts rebutting the claims made by the court-appointed experts.
The holding is muddled by the Court's litany of the many particular inadequacies
of the state process in Panetti's case, including misinformation supplied by the
court and a possible failure of the court to adhere to a state law requirement that a
final competency hearing be held.23 Thus, it remains an open question whether, in
16 Id. at 427.
17 Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842, 2859 (2007).
18 Id.
19 Id. at 2860.
20 Id. at 2862.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 2857.
23 Id. at 2856-57.
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the context of Ford competency determinations, the sort of "paper hearings"24
preferred by many Texas post-conviction courts comport with the requirements of
due process. The Court held only that what occurred in Panetti's particular case
was inadequate; it made clear that it was not prepared to decide "whether other
procedures, such as the opportunity for discovery or for the cross-examination of
witnesses, would in some cases be required under the Due Process Clause. 25
It may be that the most significant holding of Panetti is its interpretation of
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), permitting
Panetti to file his Ford claim in a second habeas petition after an earlier petition
raising challenges to his conviction and sentence had been denied. AEDPA flatly
forbids "second or successive" habeas petitions except in narrow circumstances not
applicable to Panetti's case.26 But the Court held that requiring all death row
petitioners to raise Ford claims in their initial federal habeas petitions, long before
their executions were even scheduled, would require diligent attorneys to raise
such claims in every case-even if frivolous--in order to preserve the issue for
those prisoners whose mental health turned out to deteriorate on death row to such
a degree as to preclude execution. The Court concluded that the perverse
implications of such a requirement for habeas practice, along with the failure of
such a requirement to promote AEDPA's purposes of furthering comity, finality,
and federalism, counseled against a formal, literal reading of the language of the
statute. This holding is one that may have important consequences not only for
death row petitioners with Ford claims, but also for all habeas petitioners in future
interpretations of AEDPA. What consequences it will have more broadly,
however, seems to be entirely up to Justice Kennedy, given that Panetti's AEDPA
holding is in tension with the Court's decision exactly two weeks earlier in Bowles
v. Russell,27 in which the opposite 5-4 alignment (with Kennedy swinging the other
way) refused to make an equitable exception to the time limits in the Federal Rules
of Appellate Procedure. The Court held that a habeas petitioner's appeal was time-
barred, even though he filed it with the 17-day period erroneously granted by the
district court to appeal, because the applicable Rule granted only 14 days. In
Bowles, the Court declined to take the practical and purposive approach to
statutory interpretation that it later applied in Panetti. Thus, even though Panetti's
habeas holding is more clear and far-reaching than its interpretations of Ford, we
are still left wondering what, precisely, it will mean for the future.
24 Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, A Tale of Two Nations: Implementation of the Death
Penalty in "Executing" Versus "Symbolic" States in the United States, 84 TEx. L. REV. 1869, 1887
(2006) (describing Texas post-conviction proceedings in which "trial courts hold euphemistically
termed 'paper hearings' in which the two sides submit conflicting affidavits, and the court simply
endorses one version (typically the prosecution's) over the other").
25 Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2858.
26 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) (2000).
27 127 S. Ct. 2360 (2007).
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The tensions and uncertainties that plague Panetti's three central doctrinal
holdings are substantial and important. But they pale in comparison to the larger
tensions and uncertainties that plague the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence. Panetti leaves us not only with questions about particular doctrines,
but also with more global questions about the proper scope of Eighth Amendment
constraints on punishment and the methodology for determining that scope. What
follows is a brief sketch of three of these deeper questions that are highlighted and
exacerbated by Panetti.
I. IS THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AGNOSTIC ABOUT PENOLOGICAL PURPOSES?
In the non-capital context, the Supreme Court has insisted that the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments entails a
requirement-albeit a minimal one-of "proportionality." But what must
punishments be proportional to? And what methodology should the Court use in
making this determination? The Court's answers to these questions have rightly
been termed a "mess ' '28 and recently have led numerous scholars to offer ways to
"clean [it] up. '2 9 In the morass, however, one theme has remained consistent: the
Court insists that the Constitution is agnostic when it comes to penological
purposes. That is, states are free to choose their penal goals and to structure their
punitive practices to achieve those goals.
In one of the Court's earliest cases applying the Eighth Amendment to state
criminal prohibitions, Powell v. Texas,30 a badly fractured Court upheld the
petitioner's conviction for public drunkenness, despite the trial court's "finding"
that he suffered from a compulsion to drink that was a product of the "disease" of
chronic alcoholism. Writing for the plurality, Justice Marshall explained that the
Court should be wary of constitutionalizing the substantive criminal law because
"[it] has always been thought to be the province of the States" to address "the
tension between the evolving aims of the criminal law and changing religious,
moral, philosophical, and medical views of the nature of man. 31 In the Court's
most recent case applying the Eighth Amendment to a non-capital criminal
28 Tom Stacy, Cleaning Up the Eighth Amendment Mess, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 475
(2005).
29 Id. See also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REv. 1049
(2004); Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth
Amendment: "Proportionality" Relative to What?, 89 MINN. L. REv. 571 (2005); Pamela S. Karlan,
"Pricking the Lines ": The Due Process Clause, Punitive Damages, and Criminal Punishment, 88
MINN. L. REv .880 (2004); Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment,
91 VA. L. REv. 677 (2005); Margaret Raymond, "No Fellow in American Legislation": Weems v.
United States and the Doctrine of Proportionality, 30 VT. L. REv. 251 (2006); Alice Ristroph,
Proportionality as a Principle ofLimited Government, 55 DUKE L. REv. 263 (2005).
30 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
"' Id. at 536.
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sentence, Ewing v. California,32 the Court upheld a sentence of twenty-five years
to life for the theft of three golf clubs under California's harsh "three-strikes-
you're-out" sentencing regime. Once again, the Court stressed "the primacy of the
legislature, the variety of legitimate penological schemes, [and] the nature of our
federal system"' 33 as reasons to take a highly deferential stance in reviewing state
punishment outcomes under the Eighth Amendment. The Court insisted that "the
Constitution 'does not mandate adoption of any one penological theory."'34 Only
if a punishment is grossly disproportionate with regard to any possible purpose of
punishment should the Court perform a more searching Eighth Amendment
analysis. The Court observed that California's draconian sentencing scheme
reflected its legislature's judgment that "protecting the public safety requires
incapacitating criminals who have already been convicted of at least one serious or
violent crime." 3 That legislative choice was entitled to deference under the Eighth
Amendment, held the Court, despite Ewing's substantial claim that his punishment
exceeded what could be considered just in relation to his moral culpability, under a
retributive or "just deserts" theory.
Whatever one thinks of the Court's "any penological theory will do" approach
in its non-capital Eighth Amendment cases, it at least has the virtue of being
unambiguous. The Court's Eighth Amendment cases in the capital context are
another story. Starting in Furman v. Georgia,36 members of the Court began to
talk in terms of the purposes of punishment, rejecting capital punishment as "cruel
and unusual" if it could not be said to serve any valid penological end,37 or for
some of the justices, if it could not serve any penological end more effectively than
a less severe penalty.38 Quickly, though, the Court's capital cases began to narrow
the field of valid ends that capital punishment might serve. In Gregg v. Georgia,
39
the plurality explained that "[t]he death penalty is said to serve two principal social
purposes: retribution and deterrence,' 40 relegating incapacitation to a footnote--in
sharp contrast to its more recent non-capital cases. Less than a decade later, in
32 538 U.S. 11 (2003).
33 Id. at 23 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 510 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991)).
34 Id. at 25 (quoting Harmelin, 510 U.S. at 999).
31 Id. at 25.
36 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
37 Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring) (capital punishment invalid as administered because "the
penalty is so infrequently imposed that the threat of execution is too attenuated to be of substantial
service to criminal justice").
38 Id. at 286 (Brennan, J., concurring) (capital punishment invalid because it "cannot be
shown to serve any penal purpose more effectively than a significantly less drastic punishment'); id.
at 359 (Marshall, J., concurring) (capital punishment invalid because it "serves no purpose that life
imprisonment could not serve equally well").
39 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
40 Id. at 183.
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Spaziano v. Florida,4' the Court engaged in a lengthy and confusing discussion
about whether the purposes of capital punishment differ from those of other
criminal punishments, accepting that "the primary justification for the death
penalty is retribution," while at the same time acknowledging that "the distinctions
between capital and noncapital sentences are not so clear" and that the death
penalty, like ordinary criminal punishments, also serves other ends.42 As for
incapacitation, the Spaziano Court noted ambiguously (and in the passive voice)
that although "incapacitation has never been embraced as a sufficient justification
for the death penalty, it is a legitimate consideration in a capital sentencing
proceeding. 43  Since then, the Court has been fairly consistent in reiterating
Gregg's emphasis on the twin goals of retribution and deterrence as permissible
penological ends for capital punishment, most notably in its recent cases outlawing
capital punishment for juvenile offenders and offenders with mental retardation."
Consistent, however, is not the same as convincing. It is hard to accept the
Court's claims that there is no plausible deterrence rationale that might support a
legislative choice in favor of capital punishment in many of the contexts in which
the Court has so held. For example, as the dissenters in Atkins v. Virginia and
Roper v. Simmons argued, it is implausible that any deterrent effect of capital
punishment is wholly inapplicable to all juveniles or people with mental
retardation: "[S]urely the deterrent effect of a penalty is adequately vindicated if it
successfully deters many, but not all, of the target class. 45 This criticism has
particular strength in the Ford competence-to-be-executed context. As one scholar
has trenchantly observed:
[A]ssuming executions have any deterrent effect, executions of people
with mental illness are as likely to deter as any other type of execution.
Indeed the deterrent effect of the death penalty might even be enhanced
because the populace would be assured of the state's resolve to kill and
potential criminals who bank on their ability to malinger illness will be
faced with the most powerful dissuasion.46
Rather, a better understanding of the Court's holdings is that retribution alone
is a necessary limit on the constitutional use of capital punishment. Indeed, it is
hard to make much sense of the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence without
such an understanding. The Court's insistence that a capital defendant is
41 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
42 Id. at 461.
41 Id. at 461-62.
44 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
4' Atkins, 536 U.S. at 351 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Simmons 543 U.S. at 621-22
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
46 Christopher Slobogin, Mental Illness and the Death Penalty, 24 MENTAL & PHYSICAL
DISABILITY L. REP. 667, 671 (2000) (footnote omitted).
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constitutionally entitled to an individualized sentencing decision-during which
the sentencer must consider any evidence about the defendant's offense,
background, and character that might call for a sentence less than death-seems to
enshrine retribution alone as a necessary condition for the constitutional imposition
of the death penalty.47 The Court's emphasis on ensuring a "reasoned moral
response' as to a capital defendant's crime, too, seems necessarily to require an
assessment of individual moral culpability-the touchstone of retributive theory.
Confusingly, the Court continues to speak of multiple permissible purposes of
capital punishment, leaving numerous questions hanging: Is incapacitation ever to
be accorded any weight in evaluating a legislative choice in favor of capital
punishment? If not, why not? What distinguishes capital punishment from other
criminal punishments that renders incapacitation an insufficient legislative
interest? Is retribution a constitutional limit on the permissible use of capital
punishment? Or can a deterrent effect-which researchers are increasingly
seeking to prove 49 --suffice to justify the death penalty, even upon offenders who
lack sufficient culpability in retributive terms? If retribution alone is a necessary
constitutional limit, once again, why only in the context of capital punishment?
Panetti not only fails to answer these questions, it highlights and heightens the
tensions that currently exist. On the incapacitation question, the Panetti opinion is
silent on whether incapacitation may ever be considered among the "proper
purposes" of capital punishment. Rather, it states simply that "[g]ross delusions
stemming from a severe mental disorder may put an awareness of a link between a
crime and its punishment in a context so far removed from reality that the
punishment can serve no proper purpose."50  Of course, awareness of the link
between a crime and its punishment is not necessary for capital punishment to
forever incapacitate a dangerous murderer, so it seems logical to conclude from
this statement that incapacitation is excluded from the Court's lexicon of "proper
purposes." But the Court never exactly says so. And the Court's silence on this
issue continues to leave litigants and lower federal and state courts at a loss. The
openness of this question is reflected in Texas's brief on the merits, when it
addresses incapacitation as one of the "modem penological interests behind the
death penalty"--but only in a footnote, citing the incapacitation footnote in Gregg
and the confusing discussion in Spaziano.
51
47 Indeed, I have argued elsewhere that this retributive focus on moral culpability is the best
way to understand the Court's individualized sentencing requirement in capital cases. See Carol S.
Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Let God Sort Them Out? Refining the Individualization Requirement in
Capital Sentencing, 102 YALE L.J. 835 (1992).
48 See California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
49 See generally Jeffrey Fagan, Death and Deterrence Redux: Science, Law, and Causal
Reasoning on Capital Punishment, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 255 (2006) (reviewing the new wave of
deterrence studies that have appeared in the past five years).
50 Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842, 2862 (2007) (emphasis added).
5' Brief for Respondent at 43 n.24, Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842 (2007) (No. 06-
6407).
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As for whether retribution is a constitutional requirement, Panetti is similarly
cagey. All of the briefs filed on both sides of the case spent virtually all of their
allotted pages focusing on whether the execution of someone like Panetti furthered
any retributive purpose, suggesting that the litigants predicted that the Court would
treat retribution as a necessary constitutional limit on the use of capital
punishment. But while the Court gives retribution pride of place in its discussion,
it stops short of explicitly endorsing the primacy of retribution in the capital
context. Rather, the Panetti opinion lists all of the diverse reasons offered by
Marshall's plurality opinion in Ford for why the execution of an insane person
might be considered cruel and unusual punishment, including its failure to deter
others or to serve a retributive purpose. Then, the Panetti Court goes on to single
out retribution:
Considering the last-whether retribution is served-At might be said that
capital punishment is imposed because it has the potential to make the
offender recognize at last the gravity of his crime and to allow the
community as a whole, including the surviving family and friends of the
victim, to affirm its own judgment that the culpability of the prisoner is
so serious that the ultimate penalty must be sought and imposed.5
Does this singling out of retribution mean that the furthering of a retributive
purpose is a necessary condition for constitutional imposition of the death penalty?
If so, then why list all of Marshall's other reasons, and why the tentative language:
"it might be said. . ."? And why, too, the continued insistence on the twin goals of
retribution and deterrence, and the continued silence on the relevance of
incapacitation?
Morever, Panetti's understanding of retribution stands in stark contrast to the
work that retribution has done in much of the rest of the Court's Eighth
Amendment cases. In the individualization context, the Court has insisted that
jurors must at least consider evidence that lessens the moral culpability of the
defendant. And in Atkins and Simmons, the Court relied upon retribution to
categorically rule out capital punishment for those offenders "whose culpability or
blameworthiness is diminished, to a substantial degree, by reason of youth and
immaturity.'53 But the role of retribution as invoked by the Panetti Court is more
obscure, given that Panetti's mental state at the time of his execution has nothing
to do with his culpability at the time of his crime. Rather, the Court stresses the
interest in having the offender "recognize ...the gravity of his crime" and in
having "the community as a whole" affirm its judgment of the culpability of the
offender. How both of these interests are encompassed by retribution (the same
retribution that requires punishment proportionate to culpability?) is never
explained. Nor does the Court explain why the community's expressive interest is
52 Panetti, 127 S. Ct. at 2861.
53 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005).
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undermined by the execution of an offender who has become mentally
incompetent: why can't the execution still express abhorrence of the offender's
culpable act committed when the offender presumably was competent? In addition
to leaving the primacy of retribution in question, the Panetti Court manages to
raise new questions about the meaning of retribution as well.
At the end of the day, the most one can say about the Panetti decision's
implications for the debate about the constitutional purposes of capital vs. non-
capital punishment is that the Court, like many a fine law student, has left its
options wide open.
II. WHAT SHOULD HAPPEN WHEN PENOLOGICAL PURPOSES, EMERGING
CONSENSUS, AND COMMON LAW PRACTICE CONFLICT IN EIGHTH
AMENDMENT ANALYSIS?
In Atkins and Simmons, the Court's discussion of the penological purposes
advanced by the imposition of capital punishment served only to confirm the
Court's central Eighth Amendment judgment that there was an emerging national
consensus that the execution of offenders with mental retardation and offenders
under the age of eighteen was no longer in accord with "evolving standards of
decency." In contrast, in Panetti, the Court began and ended with penological
purposes, though it invited the district court to apply its Atkins and Simmons
methodology on remand. What should happen if it turns out that the competency
standard rejected by the Court is not rejected by consensus? Or worse, that it is
supported by consensus?
54
The converse of this problem exists as well. The discussion in the previous
section sketched some of the vulnerabilities in the Court's conclusion that
execution of an offender who had become mentally incompetent "can serve no
proper purpose." What if a court were to conclude that in fact, such executions do
serve proper penological purposes, but that there is nonetheless a societal
consensus against the practice? In Simmons, the Court reiterated that "the
Constitution contemplates that in the end our own judgment will be brought to bear
on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth
Amendment."55 Should the Court's bringing of its own judgment to bear ever
validate a practice that consensus appears to reject?
A third conundrum arises from the consideration of common law practice.
The Court in Ford began by determining that execution of the insane was among
"those modes or acts of punishment that had been considered cruel and unusual at
the time that the Bill of Rights was adopted," 56 and then concluded that "[t]his
54 It appears that Texas is not alone in applying such a narrow and formalistic competency
standard. See, e.g., Timberlake v. State, 858 N.E.2d 625 (Ind. 2006).
55 Simmons, 543 U.S. at 563 (citation and internal quotations omitted).
56 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986).
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ancestral legacy has not outlived its time. 57 But what if it turns out that the
ancestral legacy is more generous to a capital defendant than modem practice?
Does common law practice trump current consensus? What if we don't evolve
toward greater decency?
Panetti raises each of these possible conflicts. The problems arise because the
Court has identified three possibly conflicting sources of Eighth Amendment
prohibition in the capital context: common law practice, emerging consensus, and
the Court's own judgment about the purposes of capital punishment. But the Court
hasn't yet found a case where these conflict (though it has acknowledged that
emerging consensus trumps common law practice, at least when the consensus
reflects our evolution toward greater decency). The questions raised by the Panetti
case, however, create the possibility of such conflicts, and the Court gives little if
any guidance as to how to address them.
The Panetti Court began with the clear consensus recognized in Ford-in
both common law practice and current legislation-against the execution of the
insane. But the Panetti Court did not turn to either common law practice or
current legislation to decide what the substantive insanity standard should be.
Rather, it turned to its own judgment about the purposes of capital punishment to
conclude that the Fifth Circuit's narrow standard was insufficient. However, it
declined to formulate the proper standard, remanding instead for the district court
to make that determination in the context of more fact-finding--and for application
of the "emerging consensus" approach of Atkins and Simmons. What can such a
remand possibly mean? What if the district court decides to canvas the application
of the Ford standard in other states (as both Panetti and Texas did in their briefs
before the Supreme Court, both claiming victory)? And what if the district court
should conclude that there is no consensus rejecting the Fifth Circuit's narrow and
formalistic standard? Would such a finding invalidate the Court's conclusion that
the standard is constitutionally inadequate? It doesn't seem plausible that the
Court meant its holding to be provisional in this way. But what, then, did its
remand instructions mean? And, more generally, what should happen in future
cases when the Court's own judgment about penological purposes invalidates a
capital punishment practice in the absence of a consensus against that practice?
Or consider the converse. What if a different Supreme Court were to
conclude that the rationale of Ford was simply wrong, that there are good reasons
to execute those who have become incompetent while awaiting execution (reasons
that might flow from incapacitation, deterrence, or retribution of some sort or
another)? Or what if any court were to reach a similar conclusion about some
other use of capital punishment that appears to be rejected by contemporary
consensus (the execution of child rapists who do not kill might be such an
example 58)? What weight should be accorded a court's "own judgment" in an
"7 Id. at 408.
58 See, e.g., State v. Kennedy, 957 So. 2d 757 (La. 2007) (upholding capital sentence for child
rapist).
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Eighth Amendment calculus if the court's judgment would permit a practice that
consensus appears to eschew?
More rarely, but not impossibly, what if common law at the time of the
Founding precluded practices that are now more commonplace? An amicus brief
filed on behalf of a group of legal historians in support of Panetti argued that "the
common law did not draw the fine lines"'59 delineated by the Fifth Circuit, citing
Blackstone's report of a refusal to execute someone who was only "half a
madman.' 60 If the Fifth Circuit's approach were widely adopted (and if the
historians' account of common law practice is correct), could an emerging modem
consensus rescue a practice that would have been eschewed at the Founding? Or is
the Eighth Amendment a one-way ratchet, giving modem capital defendants all the
"decency" they would have had in the eighteenth century, as well as any further
protections that have developed since then?
Panetti represents an uneasy departure from the Court's recent precedents in
its failure either to note early common law practice or to canvas current consensus
before invalidating the competency standard adopted by the Fifth Circuit. Perhaps
the Court meant to suggest that common law and consensus are relevant only to the
"big picture" question about whether a practice-execution of the insane--is
constitutionally permissible, but not to the more technical question of what exactly
counts as "insane." If that is so, however, the Court needs both to state it more
clearly and explain why it should be so. In any event, the Court's decision in
Panetti has only heightened questions about the relationship among the different
sources of Eighth Amendment authority.
III. WILL THE COURT'S EIGHTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE REMAIN LARGELY
PROCEDURAL, OR WILL IT MORE EXTENSIVELY REGULATE SUBSTANTIVE
OUTCOMES IN CAPITAL CASES?
Panetti heightens a third ambiguity in the Supreme Court's Eighth
Amendment capital jurisprudence. The early cases that established the Court's
current scheme of constitutional regulation of capital punishment took a largely
procedural approach to delineating the implications of the Eighth Amendment for
state death penalty practices. The first major constitutional intervention,
Witherspoon v. Illinois,6' dealt with the composition of capital sentencing juries,
and then the watershed decisions in Furman and Gregg established that certain
kinds of capital sentencing procedures--the "guided discretion" schemes upheld in
59 Brief for Legal Historians as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 14, Panetti v.
Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842 (2007) (No. 06-6407).
60 Id. at 16 (internal quotation marks omitted).
61 391 U.S. 510 (1968) (holding that the Eighth Amendment forbids the exclusion of jurors
from capital sentencing proceedings merely because they expressed conscientious scruples against
the death penalty).
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Georgia, Florida, and Texas62 -passed constitutional muster and allowed
executions to proceed again after a four-year constitutionally required hiatus. Most
of the constitutional litigation that followed over the past thirty-plus years has been
along these procedural dimensions, filling in the outlines of the Court's evolving
vision of a constitutionally adequate capital sentencing process. The Court, with
rare exceptions (until recently) steered clear of direct regulation of capital
sentencing outcomes. Rather, despite invitations to rule on claims regarding
disparate racial impact in capital sentencing patterns 63 and the wholesale
inappropriateness of executing juvenile 64 or mentally retarded offenders,65 the
Court continued to generate ever more nuanced Eighth Amendment doctrine
regarding the adequacy of state capital sentencing procedures, while turning a
blind eye to particular outcomes or patterns of outcomes.66
In very recent years, however, the Court has forged a bold and startling new
path with its decisions in Atkins and Simmons, outlawing the execution of juvenile
and mentally retarded offenders. These cases, which both overturned fairly recent
precedents, reflect a new willingness to develop substantive limitations on the use
of capital punishment under the Eighth Amendment. They also reflect a new
methodology for detecting "evolution" in "standards of decency" in their
consideration of the views of the world community, expert organizations, diverse
religious groups, and the public (as reflected in polling data).67 These new
developments have led litigants, courts, legislatures, and the bar to consider new
substantive challenges to capital sentencing practices, including the permissibility
of executing those suffering from serious mental illness at the time of their
68 69offenses, and the cruelty of current lethal injection protocols.69
Panetti was a case that could have been decided either on substantive or
procedural grounds. Indeed, many thought that the case would be dismissed on
62 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek
v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
63 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
64 See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
65 See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
66 See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two
Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARv. L. REv. 355, 414 (1995)
(critiquing the Court's unwillingness to address outcomes of capital sentencing processes under the
Eighth Amendment).
67 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
316-17 n.21 (2002).
68 See, e.g., Richard J. Bonnie, Mentally Il Prisoners on Death Row: Unsolved Puzzles for
Courts and Legislatures, 54 CATH. U. L. REv. 1169 (2005); Christopher Slobogin, Mental Disorder
as an Exemption from the Death Penalty: The ABA -IRR Task Force Recommendations, 54 CATH. U.
L. REv. 1133 (2005).
69 See, Baze v. Rees, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 966 (Sept. 25, 2007) (granting certiorari to consider
Eighth Amendment challenge to Kentucky's lethal injection protocol); see also Note, A New Test for
Evaluating Eighth Amendment Challenges to Lethal Injections, 120 HARv. L. Rev. 1301 (2007).
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purely procedural grounds, as a second habeas petition formally precluded by
AEDPA. Once the Court decided to reach the merits, though, there was still a
plausible procedural resolution of the case: the Court could have agreed with the
lower federal courts' rejection of the state-court competency proceedings as
procedurally inadequate while affirming the Fifth Circuit's narrow competency
standard. Such a holding would have been at peace with the Supreme Court's
earlier procedurally focused Eighth Amendment jurisprudence-and, indeed, with
Ford itself, which was in large part a case about inadequate state procedures for
addressing claims of incompetence at the time of execution. In fact, the Court
addressed in great detail the procedural inadequacies of the state court proceedings
in the case-listing with precision the many failings of the state trial court---when
it could have simply affirmed the lower federal courts' holdings on this issue.
But the Court also went on to address the substantive question of the proper
standard for assessing competence to be executed and forged new ground in its
rejection of the Fifth Circuit's restrictive standard. Although the Court claimed to
be governed by the "logic" of Ford,7 ° it established a new logic by creating a
hierarchy among the many competing rationales listed in Ford and focusing its
discussion on the retributive rationale for Ford's "substantive restriction on the
State's power to take the life of an insane prisoner.",7' Moreover, as the Court
recognized, its invalidation of the Fifth Circuit's standard will inevitably require
the announcement of a new minimum standard for the evaluation of competence to
be executed, and the grounds for that standard will draw the Court (or lower courts
in the first instance) into the same kind of substantive Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence reflected in the Atkins and Simmons decisions.
The earlier, largely procedural, Eighth Amendment doctrine had some clear
advantages for the Court. It was more respectful of states' substantive choices and
penological theories: as long as a state provided adequate guidance to its capital
sentencers, it was free to guide them wherever it liked. Moreover, as members of
the judiciary, the Court could feel confident in its judgments about the adequacy of
procedures and did not need to worry about its institutional competence to address
statistical claims of discrimination or psychological claims about the cognitive
abilities of juveniles or offenders with mental retardation or mental illness. But
procedural Eighth Amendment doctrine had some serious limitations, too. For one
thing, it didn't seem to work: many have criticized the Court's Eighth Amendment
doctrine for failing in its mission to remedy the apparent arbitrariness that plagued
the pre-Furman capital punishment regime.72  Moreover, the procedural
70 See Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842, 2861-62 (2007).
71 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986).
72 See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst
Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835 (1994); David McCord, Lightning Still Strikes:
Evidence from the Popular Press that Death Sentencing Continues to be Unconstitutionally Arbitrary
More than Three Decades After Furman, 71 BROOK. L. REv. 797 (2005); Steiker & Steiker, supra
note 66, at 358.
2007] 299
OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW
innovations that were most likely to work in addressing this problem-demanding
truly adequate counsel and extensive post-conviction review-would be so
expensive and time-consuming that they were extraordinarily politically unpopular
and (not surprisingly) not high on the Court's list of constitutionally required
procedural rights in capital cases.
But substantive regulation of capital punishment has its own set of costs and
benefits. It allows the Court to address directly the very thing that procedural
regularity is meant to ensure-an acceptable set of capital sentencing outcomes.
And it allows the Court to be responsive to popular national (and international)
opinion about the proper scope of capital punishment. In short, it allows the Court
to put some moral meat on the idea of "evolving standards of decency." But it
inevitably draws the Court into line-drawing that feels both more nakedly political
and more beyond its institutional competence--such as the questions it gingerly
addressed in Panetti about the proper purposes of capital punishment and the
capabilities of those with "schizo-affective disorder."
Which way will the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence evolve?
Should Atkins and Simmons be viewed as mere temporary divergences from the
largely procedural Eighth Amendment? Or is the Court newly willing to venture
further into the moral and cross-disciplinary morass of substantive regulation of
capital punishment? Panetti offers very little in the way of predictive help. On the
one hand, the Court reversed on substantive as well as procedural grounds. But the
Court was reluctant to go very far with a substantive analysis, choosing a remand
that will permit it to avoid a definitive ruling on the substantive issue for as long as
it likes. On the question of whether the constitutional ban on executing the
incompetent is more robustly a substantive or a procedural right, the Panetti
decision remains--as on all of the other issues discussed above-profoundly non-
committal.
The immediate work in the wake of Panetti is obvious: on remand, the district
court will have to figure out what competency standard to apply in place of the
Fifth Circuit's rejected one. And Texas courts more generally will have to figure
out what procedures to offer death row inmates who raise claims regarding their
competence to be executed. But the larger work that lies ahead on the Court's
continuing Eighth Amendment project is more open-ended, more puzzling, and
much higher in stakes. Hard as it may be to decide what a "rational
understanding" of a death sentence entails, it is even harder to envision the day
when it will be clear what constitutes a "rational understanding" of the Supreme
Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Panetti brings us no closer to that day,
but it illuminates some of the difficulties that await.
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